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Commentary on Mather on Octopus Mind
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Abstract: Understanding the Umwelt or being-ness of an octopus is a fascinating problem.
Mather’s review provides us with significant insights into the ways of living of non-humans that
exploit a perceptual and physical world we can only guess at. Octopus “distributed minds” call
into question our primate-based understandings of the importance of sociality and the pace of
life in the evolution of complex perceptual and behavioural abilities.

Phyllis Lee has studied primates and
elephants in the field for many years, with
a particular focus on the life history of
individuals from birth to death. Website

Mather’s (2019) review of the behavioural capacities and cognitive abilities of octopuses is an
effective response to Shettleworth’s (1993) challenge regarding the anthropocentric programme
in studies of comparative cognition. An octopus’s “way of being,” or Umwelt as described by
Mather, appears to be that of physical and sensory coordination and organization, leading to a
capacity for rapid learning, memory, and manipulation towards a desired or chosen outcome and
rather exceptional spatial abilities. Such problem-solving abilities surely reflect some element of
animal intelligence (or “higher-order reasoning processes”), as commonly defined.
At the same time and most interestingly, here is a group of species that clearly defies
many of the “rules of life” operating in birds and most mammals. Most mammals trade the
energetic requirements for reproduction against those for growth and maintenance, while
octopods tradeoff between maintenance of the optic system and reproduction; the act of sexual
reproduction results in death for males while some females survive just long enough for minimal
parental care. Being an octopus thus means living a short and often solitary life in threedimensional space and many colours, but one that nonetheless requires considerable learning.
Do you need a mind, and specifically a social mind, to be smart (e.g., Humphrey, 1976)?
Clearly, if an octopus, no. The construct of the social mind (large-brained animals, using
specifically expanded brain regions to process social information; e.g., Dunbar & Schultz, 2007)
links the solving of ecological problems with explicitly social solutions. We see these patterns in
species such as elephants, with the largest brains of any non-human terrestrial species and
exceptionally complex, embedded social networks persisting across generations and for up to
1000 individuals. An elephant mind requires long-term (over 75 years) memory of place and
individuals, threats and seasons along with inter-generational transfer of this knowledge. By
contrast, an octopus needs to learn about its constantly dynamic, shifting, 3-dimensional
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environments rapidly, with survival benefits for a group of species with remarkably short
lifespans of 5 months to a maximum of 5 years.
Despite their short, solitary lives, however, cephalopods can be classified into distinct
temperament or personality types, which, when matched between partners, have been
associated with more successful reproduction (Sinn et al., 2006). Some octopuses apparently do
aggregate especially during mating, and some form size-based dominance hierarchies (Mather,
1985); so social assessments based on a kind of individual recognition may be possible (Tricarico
et al., 2011). All of this is reviewed in detail in Mather (2019). But the general associations and
linkages between sociality, longevity and complex learning observed in so many terrestrial
mammals and birds appear to be disrupted for most octopods.
That octopods are adaptive “problem-solvers” seems not to bespeak imagination (e.g.,
Emory & Clayton, 2004), but rather generalized activities directed towards a goal; and of course,
they can learn. None of these leaning contexts, however, is that unusual even in short-lived taxa.
Fruit flies learn about another individual’s prior experiences from a visual cue (Mery et al., 2012),
bumble bees can be trained to play football cooperatively (Loukola et al., 2017), and stick insects
can play (Burghardt, 2005). None of these capacities implies that these species have selfawareness, imagination or even a generalized “mind,” as the anthropocentric programme might
suggest.
Does an understanding of the octopus Umwelt advance our perspectives on comparative
cognition? It has long been known that terrestrial predators, requiring anticipatory actions
against the movements and directions of their prey species, have larger brains than predicted for
their body size alone (Eisenberg, 1981). Calculating an octopus Encephalisation Quotient,
however, remains challenging. Gathering insights into the neural control of the octopus Umwelt
gets to the heart of Chittka et al.’s (2012) proposition that comparative cognition studies require
neurobiology – or, in the case of the octopus, an understanding of the embodied neural
connections in a distributed brain (Mather & Dickel, 2017). It challenges us to reexamine our very
primate-centric concept of mind, memory and the consequences of sociality and a long, slow life
history for intelligence (MacLean et al., 2012). So, while an octopus mind is nothing like a primate
mind, nor indeed like a dog’s, elephant’s or bat’s mind, it seems to this non-specialist to be just
as interesting and important a mind as those we see among other terrestrial or airborne species.
Restating the obvious, no non-primate’s sensory abilities, perception, responses, memory or
understanding of its world is similar to our own very primate perspective. Mather’s detailed
portrait of what it’s like to be an octopus adds greatly to our appreciation of the diversity of
cognitive abilities surrounding us, and should further shake us from our anthropocentric tree-top
perspective.
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